Supreme Distrust: How Khamenei's Paranoia Shapes Iran's Foreign Policy

As tensions between Iran and the West escalate once again, diplomatic channels falter, and military posturing intensifies, one figure remains central to the Islamic Republic’s intransigence: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Now in power for over three decades, Khamenei has forged a foreign policy defined less by tactical calculation than by deep-seated ideological distrust. His worldview, shaped by a long history of foreign interference and a revolutionary ethos, has proven remarkably resistant to change. Understanding this mindset is essential to making sense of Iran’s increasingly confrontational posture—and the failure of repeated attempts at détente.

The Roots of Khamenei’s Distrust

The Supreme Leader’s suspicion of the West, particularly the United States, is not a recent development, nor is it purely personal. It draws on a deep well of historical grievances. Chief among them is the 1953 CIA-backed coup that overthrew Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. The restoration of the Shah’s autocracy, followed by decades of repression, left a lasting scar on the Iranian political psyche.

The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) further reinforced the belief that the West—especially the U.S. and its Gulf allies—was not just indifferent to Iran’s security, but actively hostile. Western powers supported Saddam Hussein with intelligence and weapons, even as he used chemical weapons against Iranian forces. For Khamenei, who rose to the presidency during the war and later succeeded Ayatollah Khomeini as Supreme Leader, these events confirmed that the West would never accept an independent, Islamic Iran.

Overlaying this historical experience is an ideological lens rooted in revolutionary Shi’a thought. The Islamic Republic’s founding narrative casts Iran as a bulwark against Western imperialism and cultural encroachment. In this view, the U.S. is not merely a geopolitical rival—it is an existential threat, both morally corrupt and ideologically incompatible with the Islamic system.

How Paranoia Manifests in Policy

Khamenei’s distrust is not merely rhetorical—it translates directly into policy choices that prioritize regime survival and ideological purity over pragmatic engagement.

Nowhere is this clearer than in his approach to diplomacy. While President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA), Khamenei remained aloof and ambivalent. Even after its signing, he warned against trusting the Americans, imposed strict limits on cooperation, and quickly reverted to hostility following the U.S. withdrawal under President Trump. This wasn’t just reactionary—it was consistent with a long-standing belief that the West seeks only to weaken the regime from within.

This suspicion is institutionalized through Iran’s reliance on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), particularly the Quds Force, as the regime’s primary tool for projecting power abroad. The IRGC is not just a military force—it is a political and economic empire with loyalty to the Supreme Leader, and it thrives on confrontation. Its dominance in foreign policy ensures that hardline instincts override conciliatory gestures.

Internally, Khamenei’s paranoia has stifled reformist movements and purged moderate voices. Politicians and technocrats advocating rapprochement with the West are often branded as naive at best, or subversive at worst. Civil society, journalists, and academics suspected of harboring “Western values” are subjected to harassment and arrest. The Supreme Leader sees soft power not as a benign influence but as a Trojan horse aimed at regime change.

The Consequences for Iran–West Relations

The result is a diplomatic environment poisoned by mutual suspicion. Western policymakers often misinterpret Iran’s defensive posture as irrational aggression, while Tehran sees every offer of engagement as a potential trap. This feedback loop has made substantive negotiations all but impossible.

The collapse of the JCPOA, the rise in proxy warfare across the region, and the constant tit-for-tat of sanctions and cyberattacks are all symptoms of this deeper pathology. Even when opportunities for compromise arise—such as European efforts to salvage the nuclear deal after 2018—Iranian leadership views them through the lens of bad faith.

In practical terms, Khamenei’s outlook has led to a series of missed opportunities. Economic relief, regional normalization, and global reintegration have all been within reach at various points. But each time, Tehran has pulled back, preferring isolation to vulnerability. For Khamenei, no deal is worth the risk of being deceived.

Khamenei’s Legacy and the Future of Iranian Policy

At 85, Khamenei’s time as Supreme Leader is nearing its end. But his legacy may long outlive him. The question of succession looms large, with no clear candidate who might depart from his ideological path. The clerical establishment and security apparatus have been shaped in his image—anti-Western, security-obsessed, and politically rigid.

This has profound implications not just for Iran’s internal evolution, but for its regional behavior. Tehran’s relationships with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. military presence in the Gulf are unlikely to soften without a major reorientation of its strategic culture. And that reorientation seems unlikely as long as the current power structure remains intact.

The Iranian reform movement, too, faces daunting odds. While public sentiment is often more moderate and open to the West, the political system allows little space for such views to influence policy. Under Khamenei’s rule, power has been increasingly centralized, and dissent increasingly criminalized.

Conclusion

Ayatollah Khamenei’s foreign policy is not simply reactive—it is a deliberate, ideologically grounded strategy of resistance born of historical trauma and sustained by institutional power. His paranoia is not performative; it is foundational. As a result, the West’s approach to Iran must reckon with the fact that diplomacy, on its own, may not be enough.

Until there is a generational shift in leadership—or a structural change in Iran’s political order—engagement with the Islamic Republic will remain a fragile and uncertain prospect. In the shadow of past betrayal and the grip of ideological certainty, trust is not just scarce—it is unwelcome.

Author: Gerardine Lucero