CRE Crisis Threatens Banking Stability

Commercial real estate (CRE) loans are increasingly becoming a notable concern for banks, particularly in the United States. In recent years, the CRE sector has been challenged by a mix of declining property values and rising default rates, leading to what many experts call a “double default” risk. This term refers to the potential for both property owners and banks to default, creating a compounded risk. Understanding this risk, its potential consequences, and ways to mitigate it is essential, especially as the industry and banking sector brace for what could be a disruptive period.

1. The CRE Crisis: A Post-Pandemic Struggle

Since the COVID-19 pandemic, commercial real estate has faced severe challenges:

• Remote Work Trends: The shift to work-from-home arrangements has left many office buildings empty or underused, particularly in major city centres where corporate headquarters once thrived.
• Rise of E-commerce: With the surge in online shopping, brick-and-mortar retail spaces like malls and department stores have suffered, leading to higher vacancy rates.
• Falling Property Values: The property value declines have been stark, with estimates indicating a drop of approximately 20% from early 2022 to late 2023. This decline is reflective of reduced demand for office and retail spaces.

These pressures have translated into increased loan delinquencies tied to commercial properties. In 2023, delinquent CRE loans surged to $24.3 billion, a significant rise from $11.2 billion in 2022.

2. Understanding the Double Default Risk

The “double default” risk highlights a scenario in which both the borrower (CRE property owner) and the guarantor (typically the bank) default on their financial obligations. This situation is of particular concern in CRE because:

• Primary Defaults: Property owners facing reduced rental incomes from high vacancy rates and lower property values may fail to meet their loan repayments.
• Secondary Defaults: Banks, especially those heavily invested in CRE loans, may face financial strain if these defaults continue to rise. If banks are unable to cover these losses, they risk insolvency, creating a domino effect within the financial sector.

Data from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) illustrates the scale of this risk: 14% of CRE loans and a worrying 44% of office loans are in “negative equity,” where the property value is now less than the outstanding loan amount.

3. Impact on Banks: A Mounting Pressure

Banks, especially in the United States, are already feeling the strain from CRE-related delinquencies:

• Rising Delinquencies: CRE loan delinquency rates have soared, with major U.S. banks reporting a tripling of delinquencies over the past year, reaching $9.3 billion.
• Inadequate Reserves: Bank reserves meant to cover potential losses from these delinquencies are not keeping up. For every dollar of delinquent CRE debt, banks now hold just $0.90 in reserve, down from $1.60 previously.
• Potential Losses: The NBER estimates that if 10% of CRE loans default, U.S. banks could face losses totalling $80 billion. A 20% default rate could bring losses up to $160 billion, putting banks in a precarious financial position.

These numbers indicate that should the situation worsen, banks might struggle to absorb the financial fallout, further amplifying systemic risk.

4. Rising Delinquency Rates in CRE Loans

Delinquency rates in commercial real estate have indeed been rising, particularly for office spaces:

• Banks and Thrifts: Loans over 90 days past due have increased, with the delinquency rate now at 1.15%.
• Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS): These securities, where loans are typically pooled and sold as bonds, have seen delinquencies rise sharply to 4.82% for loans over 30 days delinquent.

This increase in delinquency rates demonstrates how CRE is putting pressure on banks and other financial institutions, signalling possible long-term impacts on the overall economic stability.

5. Factors Worsening the Double Default Risk

Several factors contribute to the growing risk of defaults within CRE loans:

• High Interest Rates: The U.S. Federal Reserve has raised interest rates, making refinancing options more expensive. CRE owners who took loans during a period of low-interest rates now face much higher costs when trying to refinance.
• Tightened Lending Standards: With the CRE crisis growing, banks are becoming cautious, making it more challenging for CRE borrowers to secure new financing.
• Correlation Between Defaults: A “double default” scenario becomes more likely when both the borrower and bank default. However, accurately estimating this correlation is challenging, adding an unpredictable element to the risk assessment.

These factors add pressure on the CRE market, making it difficult for property owners to manage debt obligations, and simultaneously increasing the vulnerability of banks.

6. Potential Consequences if the CRE Crisis Escalates

Should CRE defaults continue to rise, the consequences could ripple through the broader economy:

• Bank Failures: The NBER estimates that a 20% default rate in CRE loans could lead to the failure of 482 banks with total assets of around $1.4 trillion.
• Credit Crunch: A CRE crisis could make banks wary of lending, leading to a broader credit crunch. With stricter lending standards, businesses and consumers may struggle to secure loans, impacting economic growth.
• Wider Economic Impact: The CRE sector supports a range of industries, from construction to property management. A sharp downturn could lead to job losses in these sectors, slowing consumer spending and weakening the economy.
• Government Intervention: If the crisis worsens, government bailouts and regulatory changes may be necessary, similar to the actions taken during the 2007-2008 financial crisis.

7. Mitigation Strategies

Addressing this growing risk in the CRE sector requires proactive measures:

• Increased Capital Requirements: Banks may need to hold more capital against CRE loans to prepare for potential losses.
• Enhanced Risk Assessment: Banks and regulators could benefit from more sophisticated models to assess the correlation between borrower and bank defaults.
• Loan Diversification: By diversifying loan portfolios, banks could reduce their reliance on CRE, lowering the risk associated with a sector-specific downturn.

Despite the concerning outlook, it’s worth noting that the banking system today is generally better capitalised and regulated than it was in 2008. Reforms like the Dodd-Frank Act have implemented stronger capital and risk management requirements, meaning banks may be better prepared for economic shocks.

8. A Comparison with the 2008 Financial Crisis

The current CRE downturn bears some similarities to the 2008 financial crisis, but there are crucial differences:

• Market Fundamentals: The 2008 crisis was largely driven by the collapse of the housing market and subprime lending practices, leading to a global recession. The current crisis is mainly centred on changes in work and shopping habits post-COVID-19.
• Banking Sector Health: Banks are generally better capitalised today, and real estate investment trusts (REITs) are less leveraged than they were in 2008.
• Economic Impact: Delinquency rates in CRE loans today are at 0.84%, significantly lower than the 8.94% rate seen during the peak of the 2008 crisis.

The commercial real estate market is undeniably facing a crisis, with significant implications for banks and the broader economy. The risk of a “double default” scenario poses a unique challenge to financial stability, particularly for banks with high CRE exposure. While the regulatory environment and banking sector health are stronger today than in 2008, the rapid increase in CRE loan delinquencies, coupled with potential bank failures, remains a serious concern.

As the CRE sector continues to evolve, proactive monitoring and effective risk management by banks, regulators, and policymakers will be crucial in averting a potential economic crisis. The situation calls for measured caution, but it is not necessarily bound to lead to the same level of economic disruption seen in the 2008 financial crisis.